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ABSTRACT
This paper reportsnewestimates of the sensitivity of taxable income to changes in tax
rates based on a comparison of the tax returns of the same individual taxpayers before and after
the 1986 tax reform. This comparison is done by using a panel of more than 4000 individual tax
returns created by the Treasury that matches tax returnsfor thesame taxpayers in different years.
The analysis emphasizes that the response of taxable income is much more general than
the response of traditional measures of labor supply and is likely to be much more sensitive to
tax rates.
The evidence shows a substantial response of taxable income to changes in marginal tax
rates. The diflerences-of-differences calculations imply an elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate that is at least one and could be substantially higher.
There is a brief discussion and simulation analysis of the implications of these estimates
for the likely impact of the 1993 tax rate incrçases on tax revenues. Even the lowest estimated
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1in marginal tax rates. The 1986 legislation reduced tax rates
sharply for high income individuals. The marginal tax rates of the
highest income individuals fell from 50 percent to 28 percent,
raising their marginal net-of-tax income per dollar of pretax
income by 44 percent (from 50 cents to 72 cents)
The analysis presented in this paper shows that there is a
very substantial response of taxable income to changes in marginal
tax rates. The estimated sensitivity of taxable income to
variations in marginal income tax rates implies that a change in
income tax rates has substantially less impact on tax revenue than
would be true if there were no behavioral response to marginal tax
rates. This sensitivity of taxable income also implies that high
marginal tax rates create significant deadweight losses by inducing
taxpayers to act differently than they otherwise would.' Both
implications are relevant to the design of appropriate tax policies
and to choices about the desirable level of government spending.
Section 1 of this paper reviews some of the previous
literature on the effects of income tax rates and discusses the
importance of understanding how changes in tax rates induce
taxpayers to alter their taxable income as a whole and not just
their labor supply. The second section describes the data used in
the present study and considers the advantages and disadvantages of
The behavioral changes induced by higher marginal tax rates
include not only changes in labor supply but also a wide range of
other changes discussed in section 1 of this paper. All such
changes in behavior involve deadweight losses to the individual
because they alter the way that potential income is spent (e.g.,on
leisure, on fringe benefits, on tax deductible consumption like
charitable gifts, etc.)
2these panel data relative to the data used in previous studies.
Section 3 reviews the relevant features of the 1986 tax reform and
discusses how the data will be analyzed to separate the effects of
changes in marginal tax rates from the effects of the 1986 changes
in tax rules.
The basic analysis is presented in section 4 and the implied
elasticities are presented and discussed in section 5. A separate
analysis of the response of wage and salary income is reported in
section 6. Section 7 then applies the estimated elasticities to
assess the likely effects of the increased marginal tax rates
enacted in 1993. There is a brief concluding section.
1. The Effects of Tax Rates on Taxable Income
A change in individuals' marginal income tax rates can induce
them to alter their taxable income in a wide variety of ways
including changes in labor supply, changes in the form in which
employee compensation is taken, changes in portfolio investments,
changes in itemized deductions and in other expenditures that
reduce taxable income, and changes in taxpayer compliance.:
Understanding the effect of tax rates on revenue requires assessing
the response of overall taxable income and not just the effect on
labor supply.
Economists and other analysts who are skeptical about the
2The sum of an individual's income from all sources minus
certain expenses and other "adjustments" is called Adjusted Gross
Income (Aol) .Subtracting'itemized deductions" from AGI results in
"Taxable Income."
3adverse effect of higher marginal tax rates on taxable income
generally point to the literature on the effects of taxes on labor
supply. Much of this literature shows that net wage rates have
little effect on the labor force participation rate of adult males
and on the average number of working hours of those in the labor
force (e.g., Pencavel (1986) and Triest (1990).) This evidence has
been interpreted as indicating that high marginal rates have little
effect on taxable income.
Although the current study deals with taxable income more
generally, it is worth considering three reasons why this evidence
substantially underestimates the effect of tax rates on labor
supply. First, most of the studies disregard the nonlinearity of
the income-leisure opportunity locus that results from the
progressivity of the tax schedule and the existence of other
household income (investment income and second earner income)
Hausman (1991) showed that ignoring this problem causes a
substantial underestimate of the effect of increases in marginal
tax rates. Although critics of Hausman's estimates (I-ieckman, 1993;
MaCurdy et. al., 1990 and Triest, 1990) argue that his results
reflect the particular functional form that he adopted, the
analysis in the current paper indicates that high elasticities of
taxable income with respect to the after-tax rate are obtained by
a method that imposes no restrictions on functional form.
Second, many studies have shown that female labor force
participation and hours are much more sensitive to net wages and to
taxes than male labor supply (e.g., Rosen, 1976; Hausman, 1991; and
4Eissa, 1993) .AlthoughMroz (1987) in his review of the literature
reports low elasticities of hours supplied among working women, he
concludes that the participation decision is quite responsive.
Since females now constitute more than 45 percent of total civilian
employment, looking exclusively at male employment behavior
significantly understates the overall responsiveness of the labor
force.
Third, the studies focus on labor force participation and
hours because those are the aspects of labor supply that are easily
measured. In actual practice, individuals can vary their labor
supply in the short run by changing how hard they work and in the
long run by where they locate and the types of jobs that they
accept. These dimensions of labor supply may be particularly
important for higher income individuals who have substantial
discretion about the intensity with which they work and for whom
variations in effort can substantially affect income even if the
number of hours is unchanged. By focusing on income rather than
hours and participation, this studys revenue elasticities will
include the effect of effort which previous labor supply studies of
hours and participation have implicitly ignored.
Variations in labor supply are not the same as variations in
taxable labor income. High marginal tax rates encourage individuals
to take their compensation for labor services in forms that are
untaxed or subject to lower effective tax rates. Untaxed
compensation includes traditional fringe benefits like health
insurance as well as such perquisites as corporate cars, in-house
Ssports facilities, subsidized corporate dining rooms, child care,
first class travel, low interest loans, charitable gift matching
programs, etc.. Compensation that is taxed at lower effective tax
rates includes pension contributions, nonqualified deferred
compensation plans, life insurance, and stock options. High income
individuals who are self-employed or who are part of a
corporation's senior management can have particularly large amounts
of discretion about the form of their compensation. More generally,
the market will adjust the form of compensation in response to tax
changes even for those employees who do not directly shape their
own compensation arrangements.
Compensation for labor services is only part of total income.
The income from assets that constitutes the rest of compensation
provides further opportunities for taxpayers to adjust to changes
in tax rates. More specifically, salaries and wages constitute
about 75 percent of adjusted gross income for taxpayers as a whole
but only about 45 percent of adjustedgross income for taxpayers
with AGIs over $200,000. For these high income individuals,
interest and dividends are 15 percent of AGI and capital gains are
an additional 15 percent. Income from rents, unincorporated
businesses, and subchapter S corporations make up a substantial
part of the rest.
High marginal tax rates encourage individuals to invest their
assets in ways that reduce the portion of the return that is
included in taxable income. Bonds and high dividend stocks are
reduced in favor of untaxed municipal bonds, stocks with low
6dividends and higher potential capital gains, life insurance and
annuity products in which funds accumulate tax free, and real
estate investments (or other operating businesses) in which cash
flow is tax free and rising asset values are taxed as capital
gains.3 High marginal tax rates on capital gains also cause
reductions in the sale of stock and the recognition of taxable
capital gains.'
These variations in labor supply, in the forms of
compensation, and in the structure of portfolio investments can
reduce adjusted gross income in response to higher marginal tax
rates. In addition, higher levels of deductions for mortgage
interest, investment interest, charitable contributions, health
insurance, etc. can reduce taxable income further when tax rates
rise.
Taken together, existing tax rules provide substantial
opportunity for individuals to reduce their taxable incomes by
adjusting their income and expenses in response to high marginal
3Feldstein (1976) shows that marginal tax rates have a
substantial effect on the shares of portfolios invested in
different types of assets.
'On the effects of tax rates on the realization of taxable
capital gains, see Feldstein (1983, chapters 10 through 13)
Lindsey (1987a). Auerbach (1988) and congressional Budget Office
(1988)
5There is substantial evidence on the sensitivity of these
deductions to marginal tax rates. See, e.g., Rosen (1991) and
Poterba(1990) on mortgage borrowing, Feldstein and Clotfelter(1976)
on charitable contributions, and Taylor and Wilensky (1983) and
Gruber and Poterba (1993) on health insurance.
7tax rates.In addition, high marginal tax ratesmay induce
taxpayers to take more "aggressive" interpretations of tax rules
(e.g., claiming questionable deductions) or even to evade taxes by
understating income or claiming unjustified deductions.
Previous studies have identified the sensitivity ofsome of
the components of income and expenses to marginal tax rates. The
current study examines the extent to which taxable income asa
whole responds to changes in marginal tax rates.
2. A Panel of Individual Income Tax Returns
The use of an actual panel of individual tax returnspermits
comparing the taxable incomes and other tax return variables for
the same individuals before and after 1986. The data studiedhere
were produced by the Treasury Department as a nonstratified random
sample of all tax returns. For each tax return in eachyear, the
available data include essentially all of the information from the
form 1040 and some additional information from the otherpersonal
income tax forms and schedules that are filed with theform 1040.
The current analysis compares the tax returns for1995 (before the
1986 reductions were enacted or widelyanticipated) and for 1988,
the most recent year for which such matched dataare available.
A panel of tax returns of middle andupper income individuals
before and after a major tax change hasmany advantages over the
types of data used in earlier studies of taxpayerresponses to
marginal tax rates: household survey data, a singlecross section
of tax return data, and a comparison oftwo independent cross
8sections of tax return data before and after a tax change.
The use of tax return data rather than of a household survey
permits analyzing the response of taxable income as a whole and not
just of labor force participation and working hours. These data
also reflect the effects of evasion and of aggressive tax
strategies that cannot be assessed with household survey data.
The use of a panel in whidh each individual is observed both
before and after the change in tax rates provides a useful way of
identifying the effect of the tax change that is not possible with
a single cross-section of data. More specifically, the analysis
presented in section four permits a comparison of the changes in
taxable income reported by taxpayers grouped according to the
change in their marginal tax rates. This "difference of
differences" form of identification (the differences among these
groups in the difference of taxable income between the two years)
provides an identification that is not available with a single
year's cross section.6
Although Lindsey (1987b) did not have panel data, he developed
a powerful way to use two separate cross-section samples of tax
returns to approximate the "difference of differences" method of
studying the effect of changes in tax rates. To study the effect of
the 1981-83 reduction in tax rates on taxable incomes1 Lindsey
'Single cross sections of tax returns have been useful for
studying how marginal rates affect actions like charitable giving
and capital gains realizations because individual incomes and
taxpayer marginal tax rates can be taken as given, Single cross
sections have also been useful for studying the labor supply of
married women because differences in their husbands' incomes
provides the identifying source of variation in marginal tax rates.
9ranked the individual taxpayers by adjusted gross income in the
1979 Treasury public use, sample of individual tax returns and then
did the same for the taxpayers in the 1982 sample of individual tax
returns. The critical assumption in the Lindsey analysis is that
the taxpayers in the successive fractiles corresponded to
essentially the same individuals in both years.Conditional on
this assumption, he estimated an elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate (i.e., the net-of-tax
income per marginal dollar of pretax income) by relating the
changes in the average taxable incomes of individuals in successive
fractiles to the changes in their marginal net-of-tax rates.
Lindsey's analysis implied a very large elasticity of taxable
income to this tax variable. I will return to discuss this estimate
in section 4 below.
Eissa (1993) used a related method to study the effect of the
1986 Tax Reform Act on the labor supply of married women. She used
Current Population Survey data for 1984 and 1990 to compare the
change in labor supply (both the participation rate and average
hours per year) of women with high income husbands (for whom the
1986 Act implied a substantial reduction in marginal tax rates)
with the change in labor supply of women whose husbands were at the
75th percentile of income (for whom the 1986 Act implied only a
small reduction in marginal tax rates.) Her analysis also found a
very substantial elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
net-of-tax share implied by the marginal tax rates.
F'eenberg and Poterba (1993) used a similar method of comparing
10cross-sections to study how the adjusted gross income of the top
one-half of one percent of taxpayers varied over time. Their
analysis of the annual tax return independent cross-section samples
showed a very substantial jump in the pretax income of thisvery
high income group just after the tax rate reduction enacted in
1986, suggesting that much of the recorded rise in the incomes of
high income individuals in the 1980s was due to the changes in tax
rules rather than to a more fundamental shift in the rewards
available to these highest income earners. Feenberg and Poterba did
not estimate the changes in taxable income and did not try to
analyze how much of the post-1986 rise in the highest incomes was
due to changes in taxpayer behavior and how much of itwas due
simply to different accounting rules.'
Although the Lindsey, Eissa and Feenberg-Poterba comparisons
of separate cross-sections provide much useful information,a
concern remains about the extent to which the individuals in the
same fractile (or husband's income group) in successive cross-
sections are comparable. Since new random samples are continually
being drawn, the individuals in the same fractile in successive
years cannot literally be the same individuals. The real issue is
whether the individuals in a particular fractile in 1988 (e.g., the
Cop 2 percent of taxpayers ranked by adjusted gross incomes) had
'For example, after the Tax Reform Act of 1986many high
income individuals who had previously had Subchapter C corporations
converted them to Subchapter S corporations. Since the income of C-
corporations is excluded from personal tax returns while the income
from S-corporations is included, the result could be a substantial
rise in reported individual income with no change in actual income.
11the same mean taxable income or labor supply in 1985 as the
individuals in that same fractile had had in the earlieryear. If
they did not, the application of the "differences of differences"
calculations to the corresponding fractiles in successive
independent cross-sections would create misleading results.
Although the panel data of individual tax returns avoids these
problems by permitting the tax returns of the same individuals to
be followed over several years,there are also some disadvantages
of the panel data. Because the panel sample is an unstratified
random sample, the number of high income taxpayers isrelatively
small. There is also Borne attrition in the sample over timeas some
lower income individuals become nontaxab].e andas some single
individuals who marry cease to be the primarytaxpayer on the
return. Although this unusual type of panel data attrition is.
nonrandom, it is likely to have relatively little effect on the
middle and upper income married taxpayers whoare the focus of this
study.
The income of a taxpaying unit can besubstantially affected
by changes in marital status through marriage, divorceor the death
of a member of the couple. The analysispresented in this paper
therefore focuses on the largest marital statussubgroup, those
taxpayers who were married and filed a joint return in both 1985
and 1988.'
'A similar analysis was carried out fortaxpayers who were
single in both 1985 and 1980. The results (which are notpresented
in the paper) are broadly similar to the resultspresented for the
"always married" taxpayers but are more difficult to interpret
because a significant fraction of individuals whowere single in
12Retirement also generally causes a substantial change in
income- But since retirement itself is endogenous and is possibly
affected by changes in taxes, it would be wrong to exclude from the
sample individuals who retired between 1985 and 1988. A separate
analysis that excludes returns with taxpayers who were over age 65
in 1988 was also done and is summarized in section 4 below.
Eliminating the older taxpayers reduces income variation that is
related to age and causes the results about the effects of the 1986
tax rate changes to be clearer and stronger.
Despite the unstratified character of the sample and the focus
on taxpayers who were married in 1985 and 1988, the final sample
(even after other deletions described below) has 3954 "medium
income taxpayers" (with 1985 marginal tax rates between 22 percent
and 38 percent), 236 high income taxpayers (with 1985 marginal tax
rates of 42 to 45 percent) and 82 highest income taxpayers (with
1985 marginal tax rates of 49 or 50 percent)
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 combined sharp reductions in high
marginal tax rates with base-broadening changes in tax rules- The
combination was designed to be approximately revenue neutral and
distributionally neutral on the assumption that there would be no
behavioral response to the tax changes.' To increase the political
1985 were no longer single in 1988.
'See Fullerton (1993) for a very good analytic discussion of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See also the discussion in Feldstein
(1993) -
13appeal of the tax proposal, the tax changes were actually
structured so that tax revenue would decline in each broad income
class (assuming no behavioral response) and so that the resulting
revenue shortfall would be made up by an increase in the corporate
income tax.tO An increase in the "standard deduction" and in the
personal exemption caused a substantial number of low income
taxpayers to have no taxable income.
The changes in the tax rules that accompanied the tax rate
reductions mean that precautions must be taken in comparing incomes
in 1985 and 1988. Four such changes are noteworthy.
First, adjusted gross income in 1985 excluded 60 percent of
realized capital gains. That exclusion was eliminated by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. The current paper presents comparisonsamong
different tax brackets both of "Full AGI" that includes all capital
gains in both years and of "AGI Excluding Capital Gains" that
focuses on the portion of income that experienced the marginal tax
rate reduction. Both measures indicate a substantial response of
income to the reduction in marginal tax rates, Subsequent
comparisons of taxable income are based on income excluding all
'°The corporate tax was increased by eliminating the investment
tax credit and lengthening depreciation lives. This had a positive
temporary effect on the value of existing capital investments in
equipment and business structures while reducing the net-of-tax
return on investments in depreciable business capital in the
future.Since the ownership of corporate stock and of business
capital more generally is primarily by high income individuals, the
form of increase of the 1986 corporate tax increasemay have had
adverse wealth and substitution effects on the labor supply of
higher income individuals. To the extent that this is true, the
elasticities of taxpayer behavior with respect to tax changes that
are reported in section 6 of this paper will understate the effect
of individual marginal tax rates.
14capital gains.
Second, before 1986 some individuals used Subchapter C
corporations which permitted them to pay lower rates of tax than
the individual income tax, especially on profits below $100,000.
The desirability of such corporations was substantially reduced
(primarily by the legislative repeal of the so-called General
Utilities rule) in the tax Reform Act of 1986. The standard
practice after 1986 was for individuals who had used Subchapter C
corporations to convert them to Subchapter S corporations, causing
the previously excluded corporate income to be appear on their
personal tax returns (in the same way that partnership income is
treated.) A failure to take this into account in an analysis of the
tax change could lead to an overestimate of the rise in income
between 1985 and 1988. Since there is no way to obtain 1985
Subchapter C incomes, the present analysis eliminates all taxpayers
who adopted a Subchapter S corporation between 1985 and 1988.
Third, the 1986 tax reforms provided that certain "passive
losses" (e.g., losses in excess of $25,000 on real estate
partnership investments) could no longer be used to offset (i.e.,
"shelter") other income. Although there was a sharp decline in such
investments after 1986, much or all of this decline would have
occurred because of the fall in marginal tax rates even if passive
losses had not been disallowed. the basic economics of such tax
shelter investments made sense when taxpayers faced 50 percent
marginal tax rates but not at the substantially lower marginal
rates that prevailed after 1986.
15The analysis that follows presents two alternative ways of
dealing with this change in passive losses. The first assumes that
the reduction in tax losses is the result of the lower marginal tax
rates while the other goes to the extreme of assuming that none of
the reduced use of passive losses was due to lower tax rates but
must be attributed to the new rules disallowing the use of such
losses. The first therefore makes no special adjustment for losses;
the second redefines taxable income by adding all losses to taxable
income in both 1965 and 1988, implicitly assuming that the
reduction in losses between 1985 and 1988 was the result of changes
in tax rules and not a response to the lower marginal tax rates."
Fourth, the link between AGI and taxable income was also
modified in two ways that must be taken into account to make the
taxable income values for 1985 and 1988 comparable. First, the
personal exemptions and the effective zero bracket amount for
nonitemjzers were both increased between 1985 and 1988, implying
that with no change in behavior the taxable income corresponding to
any given AGI would be lower in 1988 than in 1985. Second, in 1988
(but not in 1985) taxable income is defined to be net of the zero
bracket amount and the personal exemptions so that the first dollar
of taxable income is subject to tax. The 1985taxableincomes are
11The tax return data separate partnerships with gross losses
from partnerships with gross gains. The analysis in thispaper adds
gross (rather than net) losses to taxab1e income in both years.
This extreme correction implicitly assumes not only that the
reduction in losses was the result of the change in rules (rather
than the reduction in rates) but also that all such losses were the
result of tax avoidance planning and not just economic losses on
ordinary business investments.
16all adjusted in the analysis that follows so that the comparisons
of taxable incomes are all based on the 1988 definitions.
One final adjustment is necessary to make the modified taxable
income for 1985 comparable to the taxable income that the taxpayer
would report in 1988 if the taxpayer did not change his behavior.
The 1985 taxable incomes are increased by the amount that the
taxpayer's AOl exclusive of capital gains would have increased if
it rose at the same rate as nominal personal income per capita
(17.4 percent) .Thisadjusted 1985 taxable income will be referred
to as 1985 Adjusted Taxable Income.
With these adjustments, the differences among taxpayergroups
in the change in taxable income between 1985 and 1988 should
reflect changes in marginal tax rates, changes in individuals'
market opportunities, and other nontax sources of change in
taxpayer behavior, but not the changes in tax rules as such.12
Moreover, the observed behavior should reflect the way that tax
'2There are of course some additional small changes in tax
rules that have not been taken into account. two deserve special
mention. First, the rules for Individual Retirement Accounts were
changed so that taxpayers with AGI over $40,000 were no longer
eligible for tax deductible IRAs if they participated in an
employer-sponsored pension plan. The inability to take this
deduction would raise taxable incomes but the increase would be
proportionately greater for the lowest income group of taxpayers in
this study (those classified as moderate income taxpayers) and
would have a very small relative impact on the taxable incomes of
the higher income groups of taxpayers. the result is to bias down
the estimated responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax
rates. The second change that is not reflected in this study is
the increase in the Social Security tax rates and tax base. The
combined employer-employee OASDJ-1I rate rose from 14.1 percent in
1985 to 15.0 percent in 1988. The maximum taxable base rose from
$39,600 to $45,000, slightly less than the rise in average personal
income. The increases are small and the impact is offset to some
extent by the link between future benefits and current taxes.
17rate changes alter behavior under the post-1986 tax rules with
limited opportunities for tax sheltering.
4. Analysis and Results
The analysis presented in this section relates changes in
taxable incomes between 1985 and 1988 to the changes in the net-of-
tax rate (i.e., the net-of-tax income per dollar of additional
pretax income) between those two years. The initial panel of
taxpayers was reduced by restricting observations to taxpayers who
were married in both 1985 and 1988 and by eliminating taxpayers who
created an S-corporation between 1985 and 1988. The remaining
observations were grouped by their marginal tax rate in 1985.
Table 1 shows the average Am (column 2) and the number of
observations in the sample (column 3) for taxpayers in each 1985
marginal tax rate class shown in column 1. For example, the 896
taxpayers in the sample whose 1985 marginal tax rate was 22 percent
had an average adjusted gross income of $30,455 in that year.
The average 1988 marginal income tax rate for this group of
taxpayers was 15.0 percent, a 32 percent decline from the 22
percent marginal rate in 1985. To study taxpayer behavior it is
preferable to describe the corresponding change in the net-of-tax
rate, i.e., in the share of pretax income that the individual would
retain after tax. This net-of-tax rate increased from 1.0 -0.22=
0.78to 1.0 -0.15=0.85,an increase of only 9 percent.'3
"Thisignores the role of the Social Security payroll tax.
The combined employer-employee tax rate increased from 14.1 percent
in 1985 to 15.0 percent in 1988.
18Table 2.
The Response of Taxable Income of Married Taxpayers
to Changes in Marginal TaxRatesbetween 1985 and1988
1985AGI N Percentage Changes of
ICR1985
Adj. Adjusted Adjusted
Net of Full AQI ex. Taxable ATI plus
($000) Tax Rate AGICapitalIncome Gross Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
22 30.5896 9.0 6.8 6.3 9.8 9.2
25 36.1 1012 13.3 2.4 0.6 0.6 0.8
28 42.678615.5 0.9 1.9 2.2 1.3
33 51.3 864 8.5 1.5-0.7 -1.0 -1.0
38 66.939616.1 5.1 6.1 6.4 5.1
42 92.318624.1 10.4 10.5 15.7 16.2
45 126.1 50 30.9 14.8 10.6 13.3 10.6
49 176.3 45 41.2 20.9 23.5 34.4 27.4
50 596.0 37 44.0 28.2 24.5 14.8 3.7
SOa511.3 3544.0 46.4 49.5 42.0 23.9
22. .38 --395412.0 3.0 2.4 2.8 3.0
42. .45 -. 23625.5 11.6 10.5 15.0 14.7
49. .50 -- 8242.4 26.4 24.2 20.2 9.6
49. .SOa -- 8042.4 40.8 36.2 39.5 24.3
All observations are for• married taxpayers who filed joint tax
returns for 1985 and 1988. Taxpayers who created a Subchapter S
corporation between 1985 and 1988 are eliminated from the sample.
The marginal tax rate group corresponding to 50a excludes two
taxpayers who were retired in 1988.
(092093)The percentage change in the net-of-tax rate is shown in
column 4 of table 1 for each initial marginal tax rate level. The
increase in the net-of-tax rate varies between 8.5 percent and 16
percent for individuals with 1985 marginal tax rates between 22
percent and 38 percent and then climbs rapidly, reaching a 44
percent increase in the net-of-tax rate for taxpayers with a SO
percent marginal tax rate in 1985.
The analysis excludes taxpayers with 1985 marginal tax rates
below 22 percent for two reasons. First, many low income taxpayers
became nontaxable as a result of the 1986 tax reforms and therefore
were no longer in the sample. Second, many of the low income
taxpayers who did not become nontaxable were individuals whose
incomes were temporarily depressed in 1985 and recovered to a more
normal level in 1988. The income gains of those lower income
individuals who remained in the sample would therefore reflect this
selection and mean reversion bias."
Because the sample sizes are relatively small for the top tax
rate groups, calculations are presented in the lower part of the
table that combine several individual 1985 marginal tax rate groups
with the appropriate sample weights. Separate averages are
presented for the "medium income group" with tax rates of 22
14Theremay still be some mean reversion tendency for both the
low and high marginal tax rate groups. If the low tax rate
individuals in the final sample had temporarily depressed income in
1985 or if the high tax rate individuals had temporarily increased
income in 1985, the comparison of 1985 and 1988 incomes would
understate the responsiveness to the tax rate changes.
20percent to 38 percent (identified in column 1 as 22. .38), the high
income group with tax rates of 42 and 45 percent, and the highest
income group with tax rates of 49 and 50 percent.S
Columns S compares the lfullhl adjusted gross incomes of
taxpayers in 1985 and 1988, defined to include the full amount of
capital gains in each year. More specifically, the numbers in
column S are calculated by comparing the 1988 full AGI to the sum
of the 1985 full AGI and the amount by which the 1985 AGI excluding
capital gains would have increased if it had risen by the same 17.4
percent that per capita personal income rose during those years.'6
For example, the actual Full AGI of taxpayers with 1985 MTRs
of 22 percent rose 25 percent between 1985 and 1988. Adjusting for
the 17.4 percent rise in non-gain AGI implied by the rise in
personal income implies a 6.8 percent net rise in Adjusted Full
AGI.
The net rise in Adjusted Full AGI of the lowest five marginal
rate groups varied between 0.9 percent and 6.8 percent with a
weighted average (shown at the bottom of the table) of 3.0 percent.
The relative net rise in Adjusted Full AGI then increases sharply
and monotonically to reach 28 percent among taxpayers with 1985
marginal tax rates of 50 percent. Thus while lower income
taxpayers,whose net-of-tax rates rose relatively little, saw
'5The significance of the SOa marginal tax rate group is
discussed below.
" If FAGIBS denotes the full AGI for 1985 (including all
capital gains) and AGIxCG85 denotes the AGI for 1985 excluding all
capital gains, the figures in column & show 100 (FAGI8B/(FAGIBS +
0.174 AGIxCG8S) -1]
21their. Adjusted Full AGI levels rise by only a little more than
real income per capita in the economy as a whole, the higher income
taxpayers whose net-of-tax rates rose substantially saw their
Adjusted Full AGI rise by 10 to 28 percentage points faster than
per capita personal income.
Because the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not reduce marginal tax
rates on capital gains in the same way that it did for other
income, to study the effect of lowering marginal tax rates it is
appropriate to focus on income excluding capital gains.1' cbluin
6 shows the net rise in Adjusted AGI excluding capital gains
between 1985 and 1988." Because capital gains are not large
relative to the rest of AGI for taxpayers with incomes below the
very highest taxgroups, the figures in column 6 are almost
identical to the net changes in Adjusted Full AGI (column 5) except
for the very highest marginal tax rate groups. The overall pattern
of the net changes in Adjusted AGI excluding capital gains is very
similar to the net changes in the Adjusted Full AGI including all
capital gains. There are very small increases in AGI in the groups
for which the tax rate changes are small followed by much larger
changes that increase monotonically with the relative size of the
tax rate change.
The revenue consequence of reducing marginal tax rates depends
"Althoughin the long run individuals might be able to
substitute compensation in the form of capital gains for some
ordinary income, this is unlikely to be a significant factor just
two years after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was passed.
"In the notation of footnote 16, the figures in column 6
represent l0O[(AGIxCG88/l.174 AGIxCG8S) -11.
22on what happens to Taxable Income rather than to Adjusted Gross
Income. Column 7 shows the percentage increases in Adjusted Taxable
Income (excluding capital gains) between 1985 and 1988. Recall that
Adjusted Taxable Income for 1985 is obtained from actual 1985
taxable income by subtracting taxable capital gains, adding an
amount equal to 17.4 percent of 1985 AGI excluding capital gains
(the percentage increase in per capita personal income between
those years), and then using the 1988 levels of the personal
exemption and the standard deduction for nonitemizers. Adjusted
taxable income for 1988 equals actual 1988 taxable income minus
capital gains.
Although the percentage increases in adjusted taxable income
vary somewhat erratically among the individual 1985 MTR groups, the
overall general pattern is quite clear. The average increases in
adjusted taxable income rose from 3 percent (relative to the 17.4
percent baeline increase which is part of the definition of
adiusted taxable income) for taxpayers with 1985 MTRs below 40
percent to 15 percent for taxpayers with 1985 MTRs of 42 to 45
percent and to 20 percent for taxpayers with 1985 MTRs of 49
percent and 50 percent.
The increase in adjusted taxable income for the 50 percent
marginal tax rate group is surprisingly only 15 percent. This
anomalous result can be explained by the behavior of two
millionaires (among the five millionaires in the sample) who appear
to have retired between 1985 and 1988. The first of these became 65
between 1986 and 1988 and experienced a decline in salary from $1.9
23million in 1985 to zero in 1988. The second, who was already 65
years old in 1985 and had no salary in either year, experienced a
decline in partnership income from $1.5 million in 1985 to $569,000
in 1988. The retirement of these individuals is clearly related to
age and not to the tax changes since those tax changes encouraged
more work in 1988 than in 1985. when these two individuals are
omitted from the sample, the remaining group of 35 taxpayers with
50 percent marginal tax rates in 1985 experienced a 42 percent rise
in adjusted taxable income; this is shown as marginal tax rate
group 50a. When combined with the 45 taxpayers in the 49 percent
marginal tax rate group, the combined percentage change in adjusted
taxable income is 39.5 percent.
This sensitivity of the results to a small number of
observations is a consequence of using a nonstratified sample of
panel data that includes retired and potentially retired
individuals. The use of nanel data that include older individuals
makes the results particularly sensitive to exogenously determined
retirement behavior. Moreover, since the sample is not stratified,
there are relatively few high income individuals; this leaves the
results sensitive to random events within this small group.
Before examining results for a sample that excludes
individuals who were 65 years old by 1988. it is useful to consider
the final column of Table 1 in which gross partnership losses are
added to adjusted taxable incomes. As noted in section 3, this
would be appropriate only if the entire decline of partnership
losses between 1985 and 1988 had been due to the changes in rules
24governing the taxpayers' ability to offset other income with such
partnership losses but is not appropriate if the reduction in the
use of such partnership losses was in whole or in part a response
to the lower post-1986 tax rates themselves.
Partnership losses are not at all significant for taxpayer
groups with 1985 marginal tax rates below 45 percent. A comparison
of columns 7 and 8 shows that the changes in adjusted taxable
income (column 7) and in adjusted taxable income plus gross
partnership losses (column 8) are essentially the same for
taxpayers with 1985 marginal tax rates below 45 percent. Since
partnership losses generally declined between 1985 and 1988, the
addition of these losses for both years reduces the percentage
increase in income between 1985 and 1988 for the taxpayers with
marginal tax rates of 45 percent and higher. But even with this
reduction, the income increases are substantially higher for the
taxpayers in the groups with 1985 marginal tax rates of 42 percent
through 49 percent than they are in the lower marginal tax rate
groups.
The only departure from this pattern is with the highest
income individuals who are in the 50 percent marginal tax rate
group. For these 37 individuals1 the combination of adjusted gross
income and partnership losses is not significantly higher in 1988
than it had been in 1985; the difference is only 4 percent. This
anomalous result is. however, due to the same two retirees whose
behavior distorted the estimated change in adjusted taxable
incomes. When these two individuals are omitted from the sample,
25the combination of adjusted taxable incomes and gross partnership
losses in the 50 percent marginal tax rate group rises by 24
percent between 1995 and 1988, almost exactly the same as the
increase in the 49 percent group; this is shown as marginal tax
rate group BOa. When combined with the 45 taxpayers in the 49
percent marginal tax rate group, the combined percentage change in
adjusted taxable income is 24.3 percent.
The anomalous behavior of the high income retirees suggest
that a more meaningful analysis of the effect of tax rates on
taxpayer behavior would be obtained by focusing on taxpayers who
are below the age of 65. Extending the analysis to older taxpayers
in the context of a panel of data requires an explicit model of
retirement (that separates age-related retirement behavior from
other influences, including changes in tax rates) and of post-
retirement asset decumulation through spending or gifts.
Table 2 presents calculations similar to those presented in
table 1 for a sample restricted to taxpayers who do not take an age
exemption in 1988. indicating that neither spouse has reached age
65 by 1988. This has the effect of reducing the sample by about 10
percent in all marginal tax rate groups below the 45 percent group
and by about 30 percent in the top two groups.
The pattern of changes in adjusted gross incomes (columns S
and 6) are similar in the two tables. The only significant
difference is that the rise in ACT excluding capital gains is
substantially greater among the non-aged in the 50 percent marginal
tax rate group than in the broader sample.
26Table 2
The Response of Taxable Income of Non-Aged Married Taxpayers
to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates between 1985 and 1988
1985 AOl N Percentage Changes of
MTR1985
Adj. Adjusted
Net of Full AOl ex. Adjusted ATIplus
($000) Tax RateAGICapital Taxable Gross
Gains Income Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
22 30.7800 9.0 9.4 8.4 13.6 13.4
25 36.1 90913.3 4.5 2.4 3.5 3.7
28 42.7 713 16.3 3.9 4.7 6.0 5.0
33 51.5771 8.7 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5
38 67.5 34516.1 8.0 8.1 9.6 8.8
42 94.3 15224.1 18.8 14.7 22.0 22.3
45 126.9 4530.9 12.4 14.8 18.5 15.3
49 177.7 3541.2 27.1 29.6 42.7 33.9
50 479.0 2244.0 18.4 70.6 92.4 51.1
22. .38 --353812.2 5.1 4.6 6.2 6.4
42. .45 -- 19125.6 17.0 14.7 21.0 20.3
49. .50 -- 5742.2 21.3 53.7 71.6 44.8
All observations are for married taxpayers under age 65 who filed
joint tax returns for 1985 and 1988 with no age exemption in 1988.
Taxpayers who created a Subchapter S corporation between 1985 and
1988 are eliminated from the sample.
(092093)
27The evidence for adjusted taxable income shows a more
consistent and stronger pattern of response to changes in marginal
tax rates for the nonaged taxpayers than for the broader sample
analyzed in Table 1. This is just what would be expected since many
of those over 65 are retired and can no longer adjust that part of
their income. The taxpayers with a 50 percent marginal tax rate in
1985 experienced the largest increase in adjusted taxable income.
This remains true even when gross partnership losses are added back
to taxable income. The summary section of the table shows that the
increase in adjusted taxable income rose from 6.2 percent among the
middle income taxpayers to 21 percent among high income taxpayers
and 72 percent among the highest income taxpayers. When gross
partnership losses are added to adjusted taxable incomes, the
increases are 6.4 percent, 20.3 percent and 44.8 percent.
5. Elasticities of Taxable Income with Repoect to Net-of-Tax Rates
The evidence presented in section 4 implies substantial
elasticities of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax
rates. Table 3 presents estimates of these elasticities using a
differences-of-differences method, i.e.,by comparing the
differences in the percentage change in taxable income between
pairs of marginal tax rate groups to the differences in the
percentage change in the net-of-tax rates between the same groups.
The analysis is based on the sample of non-aged married taxpayers
whose behavior is described in Table 2.
28Table 3
Estimated Elasticities of Taxable Income
with respect to Net-of-tax Rates
Taxpayer Groups Net of Adjusted ATI plus by
Classified by Tax Rate Taxable Gross Loss




Medium (22. .38) (1) 12.2 6.2 6.4
High (42. .45) (2) 25.6 21.0 20.3
Highest (49. .50) (3) 42.2 71.6 44.8
Differences of Differences
High minus Medium (4) 13.4 14.8 13.9
Highest minus High (5) 16.6 50.6 24.5
Highest minus Medium (6) 30.0 65.4 38.4
Implied Elasticity Estimates
High minus Medium (7) - 1.10 1.04
Highest minus High (8) 3.05 1.48
Highest minus Medium (9) 2.14 1.25
The calculations in this table are based on observations for
married taxpayers under age 65 who filed joint tax returns for 1985
and 1988 with no age exemption in 1988. Taxpayers who created a
Subchapter $ corporation between 1985 and 1988 are eliminated from
the sample.
(090493)
29This method implicitly assumes that there is a relation
between the percentage change in taxable income between 1985 and
1988 and the percentage change in the net-of-tax rate with a common
"constant term" that does not differ between marginal tax rate
groups. The differencing eliminates the common constant term and
provides an estimate of the slope term. Since both changes are
measured as percentages, this slope coefficient is an estimated
elasticity.1'
Consider for example the comparison of the middle and high
marginal tax rate groups. The net-of-tax rate increased by 12.2
percent for the first group and by 25.6 percent for the second
group (shown in rows 1 and 2 of column 1 of Table 3). a difference
of 13.4 percentage points (shown in row 4 of column 1). The
corresponding increases in the adjusted taxable incomes for the two
groups were 6.2 percent and 21.0 percent, a difference of 14.8
percentage points; these are shown in column 2. Comparing this
difference in the adjusted taxable income increase to the
difference in the net-of-tax rate increase implies an elasticity of
1.10; this is shown in row 7 of table 3.
Similar calculations based on the comparison of the high
marginal tax rate group (with 1985 MTRs of 42 to 45 percent) with
the highest marginal tax rate group (with 1985 MTRs of 49 and 50
"JohnNavratil has repeated this analysis for the years 1983
and 1985 when there were no changes in tax rates or tax rules to
see if there is any systematic tendency for higher marginal tax
rate individuals to experience relatively greater income increases.
He found no evidence of faster income growthamong higher marginal
tax rate groups, confirming that the patterns reported in tables 1
and 2 are due to the 1986 tax reforms.
30percent) indicates a much higher elasticity of 3.05. An overall
elasticity based on comparing the middle marginal tax rategroup
and the highest group is 2.14.
Adding the gross partnership losses to adjusted taxable income
lowers these estimated elasticities to 1.04, 1.48 and 1.25. Since
some and perhaps all of the reduced use of partnership tax losses
to offset other income reflects the reduction in marginal tax rates
rather than the special rules disallowing partnership losses, the
true elasticities probably lie between the limits shown in columns
2 and 3.
Theseelasticity values are quite similar to the estimates
obtained by Lindsey (l987b), the only other published estimates of
the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax
rate. The similarity is striking since Lindsey's estimates are
based on a different historic episode (the 1982-84 tax cuts) anda
different method of estimation (non-panel tax return data.) Lindsey
reported a variety of different elasticity estimates but concluded
that "under the constant elasticity specification the elasticity of
taxable income to after-ta)c share ranges from 1.05 to 2.75 with
most of the data suggesting an elasticity between 1.6 and 1.8."
(Lindsey,1987b, page 197)When Lindsey allowed his elasticity
estimate to vary with income, he also found that higher income
taxpayers appear to have higher elasticities. The generally higher
elasticity values in the Lindsey analysis may reflect the fact that
in 1982 there were many opportunities to shelter income through tax
losses and part of the observed response was a reduced use of those
31shelters.
6. The Responsiveness of Wage and Salary Income to Tax Changes
The panel data can in principle be used to study the
responsiveness of wage and salary income to changes in marginal tax
rates. Before looking at this analysis, it is important to
emphasize that changes in wage and salary income do not measure
changes in labor supply. This is true for two reasons.
First, there are types of labor supply that are not
compensated by wage and salary income. These include primarily
self-employment income and partnership income but can also include
compensation in the form of capital gains on taxpayer-owned
businesses. Second, not all employment compensation is in the form
of wage and salary income. Variations in marginal tax rates can
induce employees and employers to shift the form of employment
compensation from taxable wage and salary payments to other forms
of compensation that are either nontaxed or that appear as deferred
income or capital gains. Both of these factors are likely to be
particularly important at higher income levels where self-
employment is more common and greater discretion exists about the
form of compensation.
A further caveat deserves mention. It is widely recognized
that the distribution of wage income became less concentrated
during the 1980s. Some of this may be because of technological and
trade factors that had nothing to do with tax incentives. These
changes make the interpretation of the observed pattern of wage and
salary changes more difficult to interpret. It should be noted that
32mast of the technological and trade reasons for changes in the
distribution of wage income apply to incomes that aregenerally
lower than those that are the primary focus of the current
analysis.
Table 4 shows the percentage change in real wage and salary
incomes and in the net-of-tax rate corresponding to each level of
the 1985 marginal tax rate.2° Real wage and salary incomes rose by
an average of 2.0 percent among taxpayers who in 1985 had marginal
tax rates of 22 to 38 percent. These represent taxpayers with 1985
mean AGIs between $31,000 and $68,000. The rate of increase of wage
and salary income rose much more rapidly at 10.8 percentamong high
tax rate individuals (with 1985 MTRs of 42 and 45 percent).Taken
together, the difference between the change in real wage and salary
increase and the change in the net of tax rate implies an
elasticity of 0.66 of real wages and salaries with respect to the
net-of-tax rate.
The rate of wage increase in the very highest marginal tax
rate group is dominated by the experience of the two millionaires
(individuals with 1985 AGI greater than $1 million) in this sample
of nonaged taxpayers.2' The first of these individuals experienced
a nominal salary decline from $359,000 in 1985 to $164000 in 1988
but nevertheless had an 8 percent rise in AGI excluding capital
20To calculate the change in real wage and salary incomes, 1985
wage and salary incomes were restated in 1988 dollars using the
CPI-U increase of 9.94 percent.
21 Note that thesetwo individuals are not the ones that
confused the analsysis of the general nonaged population.
33Table 4
The Response of Wages and Salaries of Non-Aged Married Taxpayers
to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates between 1985 and 1988
1985 AOl N Percentage Changes of
MTR1985
($000) Net of Tax Rate Real Wage and
Salary Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
22 30.7 800 9.0 6.4
25 36.1 909 13.3 1.5
28 42.7 713 16.3 1.7
33 51.5 771 8.7 0.3
38 67.5 345 16.1 1.3
42 94.3 152 24.1 8.8
45 126.9 45 30.9 17.2
49 177.7 35 41.2 13.9
50 479.0 22 44.0 -3.6
SOx193.0 20 44.0 11.3
soy 1157.7 2 44.0 -20.0
22. .38 -- 3538 12.2 2.0
42. .45 -- 197 25.6 10.8
49. .50 -- 57 42.2 2.9
49. .50x -- 55 42.1 12.6
Wage and salary income for 1985 is adjusted to 1988 price levels by
the cPI-u increase. All observations are for marriedtaxpayers
under age 65 who filed joint tax returns for 1985 and 1988 with no
age exemption in 1988. Taxpayers who created a Subchapter S
corporation between 1985 and 1988 are eliminated from the sample.
The group classified as SOx had a 50percent marginal tax rate in
1985 but 1985 AG! below $1 million while the taxpayers classified
as SOy had 1985 AG! over $1 million.
(090493)
34gains. The second individual experienced a nominal salary decline
from $3.4 million to $3.1 million but nevertheless had a rise in
AG excluding capital gains of mare than $1 million. It is clear
that ordinary models of labor supply are inappropriate for
describing the behavior of these complex situations.
When the two millionaires are excluded from the data, the
remaining individuals in the 50 percent marginal tax rate group
(denoted by line 50x of Table 4) had an 11.3 percent rise in real
wage and salary income. Caution must obviously be taken in
interpreting even this number since some of the other individuals
with very high incomes may also have wage and salary income changes
that are not representative of their changes in total labor
compensation.
It seems safest to conclude that any useful analysis of wage
and salary income as a measure of labor income must be restricted
to individuals who are not at the highest income levels. A skeptic
might be justified in concluding that no useful analysis of the
labor income of very high income individuals is possible and that
attention should focus on broader measures like taxable income or
adjusted gross income.
7. An Application to the 1993 Tax Rate Increases
The estimated elasticity of taxable income that was discussed
in section 5 can be used to approximate the potential revenue
effect of the increase in personal tax rates that was enacted in
1993. The legislation raised the marginal rate of income tax only
35on incomes over $140,00022, increasing the rate from 31 percent to
36 percent between $140,000 and $250,000 and then to 39.6 percent
on incomes over $250,000. The legislation also removed the existing
$135,000 ceiling on the Medicare (HI) payroll tax base. Since the
Medicare tax is a combined 2.9 percent divided equally between
employers and employees, the combined effect of the two changes is
basically to raise the personal tax rate from 31 percent to 39
percent between $140,000 and $250,000 and to 42 percent above
$250,000.23
These tax rate changes reduced the net-of-tax income per
dollar of gross income from 69 percent to 61 percent for taxpayers
with incomes under $250,00Q and from 69 percent to 58 percent for
taxpayers with incomes over $250,000. These represent reductions of
11.5 percent and 15.9 percent respectively.
An analysis of two representative high income taxpayers shows
that the estimated elasticities imply that the recent legislation
is likely to produce little additional tax revenue.
Consider first a couple with taxable income of $180,000, the
level of income that the Clinton Administration identified as the
median taxpayer among those who would experience an increased tax
rate (A Vision of Change for America, 1993) .Withno behavioral
response to the higher marginal tax rates, the proposed tax changes
23This is true for married taxpayers filing jointly. The
analysis in this section uses the specific provisions of the law
for each taxpayer group.
23Thisdiscussion draws on Feldstein and Feenberg (1993)
36would raise $2,000 of additional personal income tax (5percent of
the $40,000 of income between $140,000 and $180,000) and $1,305of
additional HI payroll tax (2.9 percent of the $45,000 of income
between $135,000 and $180,000)24, for a total revenue gain by the
Treasury of $3,305.
The tax rate increases represent an 11.5 percent reduction in
the net-of-tax rate. The elasticity estimates presented in section
5 range from a low of 1.04 to a high of 3.05. Even the elasticity
of 1.04 implies that the 11.5 percent decline in the net-of-tax
share would induce a 12 percent decline in taxable income, from
$180,000 to $159,000. Because of the structure of the proposed tax
increase, this decline in taxable income would cause an actual
decline in the amount of tax paid. This revenue loss occurs because
the $21,000 reduction in taxable income (from $180,000 to $159,000)
reduces current revenue by $6,510 (at the 31percent existing
marginal rate) while the 5 percent increase in the personal tax
rate on the $19,000 (between $140,000 and $159,000) raises only
$950 in revenue and the 2.9 percent HI tax on the$24,000 (between
$135,000 and $159,000) raises only $696 for a total of $1646. The
difference between the $6510 revenue loss and the $1646 revenue
gain implies a net loss to the Treasury of $4864 for this
24 This assumes that thereis a full $45,000 of wage and salary
income in excess of $135,000per individual. If the couple
contained two wage earners and each had less than $135,000 of
income subject to the HI tax, the proposed extension of the HI tax
base would not raised any additionalrevenue.
37representative high income taxpayer.25
The revenue effect of the new legislation improves as income
rises. Consider therefore a couple with $500,000 of taxable income.
With no behavioral response, this couple would pay $37,585 more in
taxes under the current tax rates than under the pre-1993 tax
rates. But with the lowest elasticity of 1.04, the 16.5 percent
decline in the net-of-tax share implies a 17 percent decline in
taxable income, from $500,000 to $415,000. The net revenue gain to
the Treasury would be only $1460 or less than one-half of one
percent of the initial taxable income.
Although no attempt will be made here to compare the
deadweight loss of the higher tax rate with this relatively small
revenue increase, it should be noted that raising the marginal tax
rate from 31 percent to 42 percent would increase the deadweight
loss of the tax by approximately 80 percent.2'
The higher tax rates in the 1993 legislation produce little or
no additional revenue because there is no increase in tax rates on
the first $140,000 of income. A relatively small reduction in total
25TheTreasury would still lose money even if the coupledoes
not face any increase in HI tax. The rise in the personal tax rate
from 31 percent to 36 percent reduces the net of tax rate by 7.2
percent. The elasticity of 1.04 implies that taxable income would
decline by 7.5 percent, from $180,000 to $166,541. The $13,459
decline in income that would have been taxed at 31 percent implies
a loss of individual income tax revenue of $4172. This far
outweighs the additional 5 percent tax on the income between
$140,000 and $166,541, a revenue gain of $1327. The net effect of
the two is a revenue decline of $2845.
'Sincethe deadweight loss is approximately proportional to
the square of the marginal tax rate, raising the marginal tax rate
from 31 percent 42 percent increases the deadweight loss by a
factor of (42/31)2 =1.84.
38taxable income therefore represents a substantialproportional
reduction in the part of the income that is to be taxed ata higher
rate. Moreover the taxable income that has been eliminated would
have been taxed at a rate that is high (31 percent) relativeto the
increases in the tax rate (7.9 percent below $250,000 and11
percent over $250,000.)
It is the structure of the tax increase, rather than the final
tax rate or the degree of taxpayer responsiveness, that causes the
particularly large revenue losses for most taxpayers. To see this,
note that increasing a proDortional income tax from 31percent to
39 percentwould raise substantial revenue even if taxpayers
responded with an elasticity of 1.04 with respect to the 11.5
percent decrease in the net-of-tax rate. More specifically, if a
taxpayer with $180,000 of taxable income now paid 31 percent on all
ofthat income (a tax of $55,800), an increase in that tax rate to
39 percent would increase revenue by nearly 11 percent (to $61,776)
even if pretax income fell by 12 percent to $158,400.
The aggregate revenue effect of the 1993 tax rate changes can
be estimated with the help of the NBER's TAXSIM Model.2' The TAXSIM
model uses a stratified random sample of almost 100,000 individual
tax returns provided by the Internal Revenue Service. The most
recent data are for 1989 and have been adjusted to estimated 1993
27 Art earlier analysis ofthe proposed tax changes that were
eventually enacted was reported in in Feldstein and Feenberg
(1993) .Thatanalysis was done before the current elasticity
estimates were available and assumed somewhat lower estimates than
even the lowest value estimated in this sample.
39income levels.28
Three caveats should be noted about applying the estimated
elasticity of individual taxable income to the 1993 tax reforms.
First, the effect of eliminating the $135,000 ceiling on the HI
payroll tax base should probably be evaluated with a lower
elasticity than the response to the 1986 personal rate changes
since the HI tax applies only to labor income. Second, to the
extent that individuals will reduce taxable income by shifting
ordinary income to deferred compensation, capital gains, insurance,
etc., some future tax will be paid to the federal government.
Finally, individuals who reduce their taxable income in ways that
simultaneously increase the taxable income of their employers
(e.g., by nonqualified retirement programs) may not alter the
government's total tax collection.
With no behavioral response, the TAXSIM model implies that the
tax rate changes enacted in 1993 would raise tax liabilities by
$25.8 billion at 1993 income levels. If however taxable income
declines by 12 percent for individuals with incomes between
$140,000 and $250,000 and by 16.5 percent for individuals with
incomes over $250,000 (i.e., by the amounts implied by the lowest
estimated elasticity (1.04) of taxable income to net-of-tax rates),
tax revenue would increase by only $ 3.4 billion.
28TheTAXSIM model has been modified to analyze the extension
of the 2.9 percent payroll tax to incomes above $135,000. To
calculate the increase in the HI tax base for each tax return, we
use a statistical method to divide the 1989 wage and salary income
(from line 1 of tax form 1040) between the two spouses in a way
that reproduces the relation between spouses' incomes in the 1989
Current Population Survey.
408. CQncluding CQrnments
The evidence presented in this paper shows a substantial
response of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates. The
elasticity estimates are obtained by using panel data that trace
the tax returns of the same individuals before and after the 1986
Tax Reform Act. The differences-of-differences calculation based on
tax returns for 1985 and 1988 grouped by 1985 marginal tax rates
implies an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the
marginal net-of-tax rate that is at least one and could be
substantially higher.
If the long-run response to a change in marginal tax rates is
greater than the short run response (e.g. because it involves
changes in occupation, location, education, etc.), this analysis of
only two years' experience after the 1986 tax rate changes may
understate the long run sensitivity of taxable income to changes in
tax rates.
The estimated response of taxable income is not the same as an
estimate of the response of labor supply to changes in tax rates.
Taxable income can be changed by varying not only labor supply but
also the forms of compensation, the investment of assets, and the
extent of spending on tax-deductible activities. Some evidence is
presented in the current study on the sensitivity of wage and
salary income to the net-of-tax rate which suggests that it is
substantially lower than the taxable income elasticities but still
substantially higher that traditional labor supply elasticities.
41The estimated response of taxable income with respect to
changes in tax rates has important implications for revenue
estimating and for the design of tax and budget policy. For
example, the lowest estimated elasticity implies that the tax rate
changes enacted in 1993 will lead to little or no additional
personal income tax revenue despite the very substantial increase
in marginal tax rates. It follows that these tax rates could be
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